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After a decade of near-total relegation to the political sidelines in regional governments, political 
parties in Russia's regions became prominent actors following reforms under President Vladimir 
Putin. President Putin's reforms were directed at both the supply and demand side of the electoral 
market. By mandating that 50% of regional legislative seats be reserved for political parties, 
political parties became viable electoral vehicles for politicians. Concurrently, Putin regulated 
the supply of parties by raising membership requirements. As a result of these reforms, the face 
of the party system was altered significantly, bringing about the end of independent candidacy, 
and eliminating small and regional parties in favor of large, national organizations, while the 
essential features of an electoral authoritarian regime continue to restrict fair inter-party 
competition. In light of proposed reforms to the party system, the present study examines 
changes to the party system from 2003 to 2011. 
 
Introduction 
In consolidated democracies, political parties are crucial elements of the political system 
and civil society. Through parties, politicians and citizens coalesce around shared values, and 
through elections translate public preferences into policy, thereby creating linkage between the 
public and state institutions.   In societies transitioning from authoritarian governments with 
underdeveloped civil institutions, political parties assist in forming the foundation of newly 
independent civil societies. During periods of political uncertainty, parties bolster system 
legitimacy in transitional phases. (Pridham & Lewis, 1996).  
Parties have a normative impact on both government officials and the public. They assist 
in developing and consolidating the values and institutions necessary for building and 
maintaining a democratic government. Indeed, parties weigh so heavily on democratic processes 
that they are considered perhaps the most critical measure of democratization (Pridham, 1990). 
In a democracy, elections have to be considered by politicians as the only “game in town.” 
Parties are the ideal contestants. Repeated interaction between political parties, politicians and 
the polity encourages greater political responsiveness on the part of representatives; builds 
systemic credibility; and develops civil institutions in nascent democracies.  
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Given the positive normative impact of political parties on the development of 
democratic governments in transitioning societies and on political systems, the lack of a viable 
multi-party system will undermine the development of democracy. “Democratic parties can 
create democrats. But just as equally, weakly institutionalized parties and party systems can 
allow authoritarianism to take root” (Ross, 2002, p.97). There is also evidence that functional 
multi-party systems have a stabilizing and unifying effect on federal systems. Without a party 
system at the sub-national level, it is more difficult to proceed past the early stages of federal-
democratic development (Chebankova, 2010). A structurally and politically integrated party 
system helps build effective center-regional relations leading to greater policy cooperation and 
coordination. These relations in turn assist in the creation of a unified political, legal and 
economic sphere. The cohesiveness that party systems provide is particularly critical during 
periods of decentralization and devolution of administrative powers. 
In the two decades following the dissolution of the highly centralized Soviet system, 
Russia experienced federal-regional instability and lacked a national party system. These two 
features compounded one another. Political space became fragmented, stunting party 
development and the weakening the party system and further impeding the consolidation of a 
federal democratic system at the national level (Sakwa, 2008 ). In the absence of parties, the 
establishment of democratic governments was stunted in Russia’s regions (Moraski, 2006). 
Given the relationship between these two phenomena, it was proposed that the emergence of a 
nationwide party system could facilitate future center-regional stability and, eventually, a more 
democratic system in Russia (Stoner-Weiss, 2002; Chebankova, 2010).  
Attempts at building some semblance of a cohesive and stable party system began in 
earnest under President Vladimir Putin in 2001. Through a series of federal laws, the Putin 
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administration took steps to alter both the supply and demand side of Russia’s party system. The 
intention of the laws was to increase the presence of parties in the regions and undermine 
“regional fiefdoms” under the control of local political machines (Sakwa, 2008, p. 143). Perhaps 
predictably, Putin’s party, United Russia, was expected to benefit enormously (Hale, 2006). 
Opposition leaders, too, expressed hope that they would benefit from reforms to the party system 
(White, 2006).  
Primarily through the 2001 “law on parties” and the 2004 “law of parties”, sizeable 
reduction in the number of registered parties occurred. From the 197 parties registered before the 
2001 law, only seven parties remain registered today. By mandating that parties have 
membership of at least 10,000 and then at least 40,000, and requiring party organizations to be 
established in a majority of Russia’s regions, parties were forced to become national in scope, or 
to deregister or become a public organization. By exerting this new external pressure, Putin 
imposed internal reorganization on political parties, as well. If political parties were to 
successfully reregister, adaptive strategies to grow in size would have to be undertaken in order 
to meet legal requirements.  
Through institutional engineering of regional state structures, President Putin 
simultaneously increased the demand for party membership by politicians in Russia’s regions. 
By mandating the adoption of mixed proportional representation in regional legislatures, political 
parties automatically became more viable options for election to regional legislatures. As a result 
of these reforms, parties are almost certainly guaranteed greater utility for political actors as an 
effective way of getting elected, instead of, but not necessarily at the expense of, party 
substitutes like local political machines, the advantages of independent candidacy, or  
“administrative resources.”  
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The extremely limited usage of proportional representation had been a significant hurdle 
to political parties in Russia. Because a number of reforms over the last decade have specifically 
targeted regional institutions and their electoral systems, the focus of this paper will be largely on 
the institutions of regional state power and the party system.  Since 2003, after a period of steady 
decline for political parties, a relatively large number of political parties have reversed this trend 
and managed to win seats regional legislatures. If this change reflects a turning point in the 
development in the development of political parties in Russia, it may also represent a positive 
development for democracy in Russia. It should be stressed that a party system alone is not 




 Before discussing the current party system in Russia, it is necessary, as a point of 
reference, to examine the system in place prior to the reformation of the party system. In contrast 
to the current system, which is designed to ensure some degree of partisan representation in 
regional legislatures, the previous system design, with its reliance on single-member districts, 
disadvantaged parties (Moraski, 2006). As a consequence, a number of deleterious features 
became ingrained in regional politics. Among these were: the strength of independent candidacy 
and incumbency at the expense of political parties; the proliferation of short-lived and 
unsuccessful “floating parties”; and the depression of citizen identification with and support for 
the party system as a whole (Rose et al, 1999).  
By studying election returns from the period 2003-2011, it is possible to measure changes 
taking place in the spheres of partisan competition and representation in regional governments. 
                                                        
1 Although reforms to the party system may be related to the reformation of Russian federalism 
and therefore may positively or negatively impact the development of federalism in Russia in the 
future, this paper will not attempt to ascertain the impact of reforms on federal-regional relations. 
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In the case of Russia, electoral returns are perhaps the best measure of progress on the path either 
toward or away from building a party system. Elections are one of the few public outlets 
remaining for parties to reach the public because of the increasingly small “political space” 
within the Russian system for parties (White, 2006). Because of limited institutional space for 
party activities, election returns play the following roles: they serve a dissemination function; 
reflect organizational capacity; measure a party’s social base and relationships with other parties 
and with the regime (White, 2006.)   
The number of parties contesting elections and winning seats in regional legislatures is of 
particular import for this study. In contrast to the previous period, party stability, as 
demonstrated by a consistency to contest elections across multiple regions and in multiple 
election cycles, could be a positive development for the party system. In transitional, post-
authoritarian societies, the consolidation of individual political parties reflects, to some degree, 
the consolidation of party system itself (Kulik & Pshizova, 2005). Stability, of course, does not 
guarantee good governance. The parties themselves play a pivotal role in the development of a 
party system, and therefore merit individual study. In addition to PR list returns, a study of 
independent candidates, what were most prevalent actors in regional politics, will serve as a 
measure of how completely political parties have replaced the former, dominant political actors. 
 After examining election returns, I will qualitatively measure changes to the Russian 
party system. Although increasing the number of seats allotted to members of national political 
parties guarantees a greater partisan presence in regional legislatures, it does ensure more 
representative and democratic governance in Russia’s regions. The quality of political 
representation may have declined significantly or remained mediocre to poor although the 
quantity of partisan deputies has increased. It may, in fact, be the case that the relatively small 
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number of political parties reflect and represent the various social cleavages and interests groups 
in Russia. Furthermore, by their ability to reregister or inability thereof, we can discern changes 
to Russian political parties in terms of their size and scope. 
 There are a number of methodological shortcomings with the present study. Russian 
political institutions, including electoral commissions, remain corrupt (Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011). In fact, there is evidence that corruption is on 
the rise rather than on the decline two decades after independence. This trend makes the study of 
election returns problematic. In short, fraudulent numbers will present a fraudulent picture. It is 
highly likely that election fraud occurred in a number of regions used in this study, and will skew 
the data. There is a second and equally problematic shortcoming of the present study. In the 
absence of a field study, a near complete reliance upon electoral results will provide an obtuse 
picture of political developments in Russia’s regions. By making the party and deputies the 
smallest unit of analysis, this paper will undoubtedly overlook more nuanced developments of 
regional politics in Russia.  
 The trends examined in this paper are overarching trends the entirety of Russia. Local 
political issues and regional institutions are more complex than the present study can explain. 
This study contains limited data on elections for single or multiple member mandates, a highly 
influential part of regional politics in the past. Moreover, because of the length of time covered, 
spanning nearly a decade, a relatively large number of political actors appear in the data. To only 
provide a general analysis of the policy positions of each of the 74 parties and blocs that appear 
in the data is not undertaken here. In the absence of such an effort, this study will instead provide 






II. Regional Electoral Systems: State Institutions and Party Substitutes 
The initial institutional choice by regional governments in Russia greatly influenced political 
developments in the two decades that followed. Following the constitutional crisis of October 
1993, President Yeltsin substantially altered the structure of regional legislatures and electoral 
rules. From an average assembly size of 250-300 seats, regional legislatures were reduced in size 
to between 15 and 50 deputies. Russia’s 20 ethnic Republics were permitted to have larger 
assemblies, and the majority of the republics retained a larger number of deputies. Yeltsin 
decreed that regions adopt first-past-the-post, single member or multiple member districts. After 
the elections of 1993-1994, most newly elected assemblies retained structures that favored non-
partisan systems (Moraski, 2006). By 2000, only a few regions had substantially altered their 
electoral systems, with regional politicians choosing to keep their systems intact (Hale, 2006). 
 Given that new systems were formed in each of Russia’s 89 regions, the high level of 
electoral system uniformity is somewhat striking: the majority of regions (60) chose to rely 
solely on single member district, plurality vote systems rather than mixed SMD-party list system 
or full PR systems. Only three regions initially chose to distribute a portion of seats based on 
party-list PR voting (Moraski, 2006). By 2000, only four regions provided for some allocation of 
seats through PR elections (Hale 2006).  
  By not using PR systems, the great majority of regions selected electoral systems did not 
specifically provide an institutional role for political parties. Rather than building a new political 
system in which political parties would be a central component, single-member districts 
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institutionally disadvantaged parties in Russia’s regions (Moraski, 2006). With the widespread 
implementation of electoral systems that disadvantaged parties, a number of negative and 
mutually reinforcing features within regional politics became entrenched. In the relatively 
vacuous civil society of the early 1990s, soviet-era elites were best positioned to marshal 
political resources and secure their election to regional legislatures. Thus patronage networks 
occupied the space that political parties filled in a number of former eastern bloc states (Moraski, 
2006; Chebankova, 2010). For regional politicians, buttressed by “administrative resources” and 
political connections, the resources offered by political parties could not match the resources of 
independent candidates (Golosov, 2003). These alternative sources of support functioned as 
party substitutes (Hale, 2003). This confluence of decidedly negative factors depressed demand 
for parties for politicians and a skeptical public alike. In this setting, parties effectively became 
non-entities in regional politics for almost a decade.  
 
A. Party Substitutes: The Role of Regional Elites 
 The selection of mostly single- member, majoritarian electoral systems favored Soviet era 
political elites, and allowed them in many cases to maintain positions of political power in the 
new political systems. Incumbency and political networks became the greatest resource for 
legislators and governors (Hale, 2003; Golosov 2003).  For example, it was not until the mid 
2000s that former soviet officials held less than 50% of regional governor posts (Hale, 2006). 
The effect on the development of the party system and Russian democracy was decidedly 
negative. Golosov (2007) contends that the lack of elite competition and turnover is the major 
difference between Russia and other new democracies. Intra-elite competition in transitional 
systems encourages the development of political parties (Golosov, 2007).  The lack of political 
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parties formed by competing regional elites reflects the low level of political competition 
between regional politicians. The lack of political competition had a decidedly negative impact 
on the party system in Russia’s regions. With little intra-elite competition, few regional 
politicians joined parties or made attempts to build parties (Moraski, 2006; Golosov 2007).   
 In the exceedingly rare cases when regional elites split into opposing camps competing to 
win regional political dominance, sustained party competition occurred. Sverdlovsk Oblast is an 
instance of this phenomenon (Golosov, 2007). Sverdlovsk had two crucial elements that 
encourage competition between parties. Sverdlovsk had institutional incentives for parties to 
form because of its mixed SMD and PR system. Around the region’s two principal and opposed 
regional political factions, two large, stable local parties formed and consistently contested 
elections for the regional legislature and governor’s office between 1996 and 2002. With neither 
faction’s leaders able to score a decisive blow and consolidate political power, parties became a 
valuable resource of electoral support. In addition to the two largest local parties, at least three 
other local parties developed strong local support, as well. Local parties consistently 
outperformed regional branches of national parties, including the KPRF, Yabloko, and LDPR.  
 
B. Floating Parties and Floating Voters: Public Support and Organizational Weakness 
Although political parties were institutionally disadvantaged in most regions, parties were 
nonetheless abundant in Russia in the 1990s. Between 1991 and 1997, over 5000 political parties 
and more than 60,000 public organizations registered with the Ministry of Justice (Ross, 2002). 
What developed is known as a floating party system. The central feature of such a system is the 
sheer volume of political parties in the political arena. Most of these parties had little public 
support and achieved little electoral success. The chaotic pattern of party formation and 
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dissolution that characterized the 1990s predictably hurt public support for political parties as an 
institution. Russia’s political parties “floated”, and voters “floated” along with them (Rose et. al, 
1999). 
Two types of floating parties characterized the Russian party system: divan parties and 
“parties of power.” The former negatively impacted systemic development as a result of their 
lack of electoral success and short-lived existence. The latter did so by virtue of their strength, 
outsized influence and their top down formation (Ross, 2002). These parties often had short life 
spans, as well. Most floating parties were of the divan variety. These small parties lacked clear 
platforms, and lacked the resources and organizational capacity to consistently field candidates 
in multiple elections. 
 With the exception of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), which 
inherited much of the resources its predecessor party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
few national parties achieved significant “saturation” at the regional level. Few parties 
maintained organizations in multiple regions, competed in multiple regional elections and even 
fewer won seats in one or more regions (Golosov, 2007). The few parties that fielded candidates 
or, more rarely, won seats, failed to developed accountability with voters because parties were 
often defunct by the following election (Hale, 2006).  
Given the fleeting nature of political parties, Russian voters did not support parties with 
their vote or by joining parties. In 1994, during a period in which a large number of divan parties 
and civic organizations formed, only 3% of the population was a member of a political party. 
This already low percentage dropped to 1% in 2003. By 2007, after a series of mobilization 
drives in order to meet registration requirements under the new laws on parties, the percentage 
again rose to 3% (Sakwa, 2008). Russians simply had little confidence in the parties themselves. 
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The World Values Survey conducted in 1995 and 1999 found that over 90% of respondents 
expressed “Not Very Much” or no confidence in political parties as an institution (World Values 
Social Survey, 1995 & 1999).  
C. Political Parties in Regional Legislatures 1993-2003: 
With weak public support for parties, and limited utility for politicians, Russian political 
parties were largely absent from executive and legislative bodies in the regions. Golosov (2007, 
p.3) describes party politics in Russia’s regions from 1993-2003 as being “excessively 
fragmented and excessively volatile,” even as a more stable national party system developed 
during the same period of time. Ross (2002, p. 133) writes, “One of the most striking patterns of 
local politics in Russia is the almost total partyless nature of regional election campaigns and the 
dismal representation of political parties in regional assemblies.” 
Between 1993-1995, 24.9% of candidates on the ballot for regional legislatures were 
members of a party, while only 18.6% (635/3,481) of deputies were members of a political 
(Ross, 2002). By 2001, only 8.7% of candidates were party members and only 8.4% of deputies 
were (CEC, 2001; Hutcheson, 2003; Ross, 2002). Even during periods with a high percentage of 
partisan deputies, political parties were still a marginal force in most regional assemblies. In 
January 1998, 17 assemblies had no party affiliated deputies. In only five assemblies did party 
affiliated deputies constitute a majority; however, no single party held a majority in any of 
Russia’s 89 regions (Ross, 2002).  Besides the KPRF, no party could claim membership of even 
1% of deputies in regional assemblies, and no national political party could consistently contest 





D. The Influence of Regional Executive Branches on the Party System: 1993-2003 
 Regional executives were the most dominant political actors in the regions. Regional 
executives in the regions had a decidedly negative impact on the development of political parties 
at the regional level (Golosov 2007; Sakwa, 2008.). Because regional executives were both more 
powerful than the legislative branch and possessed resources independent of political parties, the 
relegation of political parties to the margins of regional politics was near total in regional 
executive branches. Like regional legislators, regional executives relied on independent political 
resources and institutional arrangements that discouraged the development of viable and 
influential political parties. The promotion of political parties in gubernatorial elections “was 
almost never a concern” for executives (Hale, 2006). 
Because of their independent political strength and institutional powers, incumbent 
regional executives remained insulted from political parties. In the period from 1995-1997, 70 
gubernatorial elections took place. In these contests, there was an average of five candidates on 
the ballot. Only 100 of the 4000 candidates had a party affiliation, and only 10 out of the 70 
victors were party members.  In the 2000-2001 cycle, 53 gubernatorial elections were held.  Only 
nine out of 300 candidates had party affiliations, and only three out of 53 victors were party 
members (Ross, 2002; Hutcheson, 2003).  
Even governors with partisan political affiliations relied more on the administrative 
advantages provided by incumbency than from party labels. Between 1999-2003, governors ran 
for reelection under major party labels only five times. Only two of these candidates succeeded 
in winning reelection (Hale, 2006). The independent political strength of regional governors 
comes into sharper contrast when one considers their continued non-partisan stance of regional 
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executives after the meteoric rise of United Russia in 2003, in which it won an overwhelming 
majority in the Duma. In elections for regional executive offices in 2004, of the ten contests that 
occurred, United Russia did not field a single candidate. It only fielded one candidate the year 
before. The election strategy of governors to parties appears to be perfectly rational. With the 
exception of the KPRF and Yabloko, party labels were found to have a strongly negative impact 
on a candidate’s election chances (Hale, 2006). 
  
III. Reforming Russia’s Institutions 
 In light of the state of the stunted party system in the regions, Vladimir Putin proposed a 
series of reforms designed to bolster the position of national political parties in the regions. 
Beginning in 2001, a series of federal laws significantly altered regional and federal political 
institutions. Putin rewrote the “rules of the game” by providing a significant institutional boost to 
political parties in the regions. The 2001 and 2004 “laws on parties” drastically decreased the 
number of political parties and affected an increase in the membership rolls of the few remaining 
parties. The structure and electoral rules governing regional legislatures and regional executives 
were significantly reformed. The former were required to implement partial party list 
proportional elections for at least 50% of legislatures. The latter became an appointed official of 
the presidential administration.  
 
A. Laws on Parties and Public Organizations 
The first significant alteration to the registration of political parties occurred in 2001 with the 
signing of the “Law on Parties” (Law No. 95-F3) Coming into effect in 2003, the key provisions 
of the 2001 law are: 
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• Parties must have at least 10,000 members nationwide. 
• Parties must have at least 100 members in at least 45 regions. 
• Parties must have at least 50 members in the remaining regions. 
• In order to secure state financing, parties must win 3% of PR vote in Duma elections, 12 
SMD seats, or win 3% of presidential vote  
 
The law was immediately successful in its intended purpose of decreasing the number of small 
political parties. Upon implementation, three quarters of 197 registered parties and civic 
organizations de-registered, leaving 56 parties. (Sakwa, 2008).  
 One year after the 2001 law came into effect, Putin signed the 2004 “Law on Parties.” 
Like its predecessor, one purpose of the law was to slim the pool of small parties by increasing 
membership requirements. The 2004 also restricted politicians by preventing public 
organizations and interest groups from fielding their own candidates. The 2004 Law on Parties 
came into effect in January 2006. Key provisions of the 2004 law are: 
• Parties must have 40,000 members nationwide 
• Parties must have 500 members in at least 45 regions where the population exceeds 
500,000. 
• Parties must maintain branches with no fewer than 250 members in the remaining 
regions. 
• Parties must contest elections at the federal, regional level, and municipal levels. 
• Only political parties may contest elections. Civic organizations can join electoral blocs, 
but cannot propose their own candidates.  
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The 2004 law successfully trimmed the size of parties even further. By October 2006, 35 parties 
had managed to register, while 20 parties did not reregister. By 2007, only 17 of the 35 parties 
previously registered managed to meet the membership requirements (Sakwa, 2008).  
 
B. Reforming Regional Assemblies, Executive Offices, and Election Laws 
Structural reforms were also passed. In 2002, President Putin signed a law mandating that 
at least 50% of regional legislative seats be elected from party lists by July 2003 (Law No. 67-
F3). Heretofore, the majority of regional assemblies elected officials in single-member, 
majoritarian elections. In 2003, the direct election of governors was eliminated. In the place of 
direct elections, federal officials overseeing Russia’s seven “super-regions”, submit a list of 
gubernatorial candidates for consideration and approval to the respective regional legislatures.  
 
IV: Regional Legislative Elections: 2003-2011 
 By studying the elections taking place between 2003 and 2011, it is capable to measure 
changes to the regional party system in relation to prior era. The seven regional elections held in 
2003 mark the first round of elections in which at least half of all legislative seats were reserved 
for political parties. Three years of elections took place with these rules before the 2004 law on 
parties went into effect in 2006. By studying this particular set of elections, three distinct stages 
of systemic development in the regions are discernable: eform, the first period of reform, and the 
current system in place now.  
The adoption of PR systems is particularly critical for political parties at the regional 
level. Now that there is a portion of the political sphere reserved for political parties, the 
institution of political parties has moved from its near-total relegation on the political sidelines to 
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being firmly in state institutions. In contrast to period from 1993-2002, national political parties 
now have a stable presence in regional legislatures. In absolute terms, the number of political 
parties represented across all Russian regions and the absolute number of seats held by political 
parties has grown dramatically in comparison to the previous decade.  
Although the absolute number of registered parties decreased between 2003 and 2011, 
regional elections became more competitive and more politically diverse, if only for a brief 
period of time (Chebankova, 2010). In the first years in the present study, adaptive electoral 
strategies on the part of opposition parties blunted the massive gains by United Russia. Smaller, 
but ideologically similar political parties consolidated into new parties or formed electoral blocs.  
In the first three years in this study, political parties entered into electoral blocs together in order 
to win a greater share of seats. Liberal, free market parties united with social-democratic parties. 
Leftist and nationalists competed together. A second form of inter-party cooperation occurred, as 
well. In regions where Union of Right Forces and Yabloko party organizations could not agree to 
join together in an electoral bloc, one party would instead choose not to compete against the 
other (Chebankova, 2010).  
Other positive trends occurred, as well. Freed of dependence on executive resources, 
regional assemblies increased their legislative autonomy from regional governors (Chebankova, 
2010). What had often been the domain of regional executive party machines now became a 
battleground for regional and national parties. In effect, federal reforms standardizing 
competition in regional legislative elections encouraged some political independence from the 
national parties and from regional executives.  
A. Russian Political Parties  
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Before examining election returns in the regions, it is necessary to briefly describe the 
major and minor political parties that currently exist in Russia today, and also those minor 
parties, which no longer exist as a result of either deregistration or party mergers. The changes 
that have occurred in regional politics are, of course, not only changes to laws and regional 
institutions of the state. At the heart of this study is the form that political competition between 
parties has taken over the last decade. To ignore the principal actors, the party themselves, would 
render the figures presented as isolated numbers separate from the actual political impact 
resulting from different parties winning or losing elections. As such, I will provide some basic 
distinctions between political parties in Russia. These parameters will primarily categorize the 
parties in terms of their size, ideological stance, and current status.  
The terms major party and minor party will be used to describe political parties in this 
paper. For reasons that will be explained in greater depth below, these terms encompass a 
number of aspects that do not necessarily center upon whether a party is technically an 
opposition party. The major parties in Russia are those that consistently contest a majority of 
national and regional elections. In short, the capacity to contest a number of elections 
simultaneously is possible because they possess the resources to do so. I have chosen to qualify 
Kremlin sponsored project parties such as Rodina and Just Russia as major parties. Major party 
status does not necessarily depend on whether a party holds seats in the federal State Duma. A 
number of minor political parties had deputies in the Duma during the period studies, but do not 
qualify as being a major party. Yabloko, the Union of Right Forces, Patriots of Russia, the 
Agrarian Party, the Party of Pensioners, and host of other parties fall into this category. These 
parties typically have a limited organizational reach, fewer resources and less public support than 
the major parties. 
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There are further pertinent distinctions between Russian political parties. These 
categories reflect, to a certain degree, qualitative measures of the parties. Richard Rose identified 
three types of prominent parties in Russian politics.  “Program” parties are ideologically and 
organizationally consistent. They have some form of inner-party democracy and hierarchy. Their 
platform is clear to the electorate. A second type of party, a project party, is notoriously 
prominent in Russian politics. Project parties are screated in order to divert votes away from 
ideologically similar opposition parties. The nominally leftist party Rodina and its successor, Just 
Russia, fall into this category because they were intended to split the left vote, thereby depriving 
the KPRF of support. The most powerful party type in Russia today is the “party of power,” also 
know as the regime party. The executive branch in Russia has organized several regime parties in 
order to give it support in the legislature. The largest party in Russia today, United Russia, is a 
regime party and has been the most successful party of power to date. 
The seven remaining political parties appear to represent the left-right, liberal-
conservative political spectrum and suggest an encouraging degree of political pluralism in the 
Russian system.  Yabloko and Right Cause are liberal, free-market minor parties. The Liberal 
Democratic Party is a nationalist major party on the right end of the political spectrum. The 
KPRF, a major party, and Patriots of Russia, a minor party, are on the left. United Russia 
fashions as a center-right party, while Just Russia is fashioned as its center-left, major party 
counter-part. Given the destabilizing and detrimental effects of the floating party system that 
existed in Russia in the 1990s, the existence of seven large, ideologically diverse parties appears 
to be a step in the right direction. For reasons that will be discussed in greater depth below, the 
existence of a number of political parties has not translated directly into equal gains or equal 
competition. 
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Party longevity is one of the most notable and potentially positive features of the Russian 
party system today. Yabloko, KPRF, and LDPR have each existed for nearly two decades. 
Various incarnations of Just Russia, United Russia and Right Cause have existed for more than a 
decade under various names. Party stability and longevity has potential to bode well for the 
future of Russian political parties. Hale (2006) found that Russian voters had clearly begun to 
identify with parties on the basis of their policy positions concerning issues in Russia and 
performance. Voters also identified with parties on the basis of socio-economic status. Given the 
nominal ideological diversity of the parties in Russia today, a number of parties seemingly 
possess the “ideational” capital to reflect the political preferences of the population (Hale, 2006). 
 Recall that in order to be registered to compete in elections, a party must have 40,000 
members and maintain a minimum number of members in all of Russia’s regions. This is, of 
course, no small feat, especially when one considers the aforementioned distrust of political 
parties by the Russian citizenry. Consequently, a large number of parties that participated in 
elections in this study are no longer political parties. Some of these were deregistered as parties 
and became public organizations (a legal distinction that prevents the advancement of political 
candidates), or disbanded entirely. Still others merged into larger parties. Given the number of 
parties in this study that no longer exist, it is perhaps not surprising that the platforms, level of 
public support, resources, and electoral success of the many deregistered or defunct parties 
varied widely. The fact that the seven parties discussed below have legal status means that they 
possess a national political organization.  
 
A.a.: The Major Parties: United Russia, The Communist Party of the Russian Federation, The 
Liberal Democratic Party, and Just Russia  
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There are four major parties in Russia today. These four parties are currently the only 
parties represented in the Duma. If the LDPR, KRPF and Just Russia are major parties, it is 
perhaps more accurate to describe the largest party in Russia today, United Russia, as a super 
major party. Riding on the popularity of President Putin (and, many critics point out, election 
fraud and unfair elections), the party has a majority of seats at the federal and regional levels. 
Although it has “lost” six regional elections between 2003 and 2011, even its defeats are limited. 
Its last regional electoral defeat occurred in 2007 to its political ally, Just Russia. Out of the 
3,447 regional PR seats won between 2003 and 2011, United Russia won 2,018 of these. United 
Russia is the only party to have competed in every regional election in this study.  
An outgrowth of Unity, the party was founded in 1999 as a vehicle to secure the 
executive office for Yeltsin’s handpicked successor, Vladimir Putin, in the 2000 presidential 
elections. A  “party of power” or  “pseudo-party”, Unity was formed with the support of the 
Kremlin, 25 regional executives and a significant portion of the federal bureaucracy. In 2001, it 
merged with another gubernatorial  “pseudo-party”, Fatherland-All Russia (OVR). United 
Russia, with its roots in the Kremlin and its electoral consistency, is a program-regime party. 
Sakwa (2008) contends that United Russia is transitioning from being strictly a regime party into 
an institutionalized, program party.  
United Russia recently merged with several minor parties that appear in this study. Of the 
three parties that merged with United Russia, the Agrarian Party was the largest by a wide 
margin. The Agrarian Party of Russia, as its name suggests, was originally formed as a political 
lobby on behalf of Russia’s agriculture interests (Sakwa, 2008). The party drew its support 
mostly from older, poorer voters. In regional politics, its presence was notable, though negligible 
compared to the major parties. Up to the point of its merger with United Russia in 2007, the 
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party competed in 34 PR regional elections, and won at least one seat in 19 elections. Its seat 
total (62) was the fifth largest after United Russia, LDPR, KPRF, and the Party of Pensioners. 
United Russia also joined with the Party of Social Justice and the Socialist Unity Party. 
Combined, these parties only competed in eight regional elections, with the Party of Social 
Justice winning five seats in one region. 
 Founded in 1993, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) is the second 
largest party in Russia. It is a program party (Sakwa, 2008). Although the party maintains a 
national political presence, the party’s prominence has significantly waned since 1999. From its 
peak in 1999 when it won 24% of the seats in the national legislature, the party has seen its 
electoral support steadily decline since then. The KPRF maintains a strong regional organization, 
however. It competed in 135 regional elections and won seats in 130 elections.  It has the second 
largest share of regional legislative seats (563 out of 3447 PR seats). Still, victory over United 
Russia has proven elusive, with the party managing to beat United Russia outright in only two 
regional elections.  
 The KPRF, too, has drawn in a number of smaller parties that are now defunct. As 
evidence of the party’s leftist-nationalist platform, two nationalist parties endorsed the KPRF 
after being unable to maintain their status as political parties. The Party of Revival of Russia and 
the Party of National Revival (Narodnaya Volya) were both minor organizations. The latter 
competed in 15 elections, winning only two seats in one region, while the former competed in 
three elections without winning a seat. 
 The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia is also a program party. Like the KPRF, its 
support has declined steadily since the 1990s. Nevertheless, it still possesses the organizational 
resources needed to compete in most elections. Founded in 1991, it was the first nominally 
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independent political party in the Soviet Union after the repeal of Article 6 of the Soviet 
Constitution, which made the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the sole legal political party. 
It has contested elections every year since then, with the height of its success and national profile 
occurring in the early 1990s. The party is nationalist, xenophobic and socially conservative, and 
is headed by its controversial leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. It is the third largest party in the 
State Duma and currently has the fourth largest share of seats regionally after United Russia, the 
KPRF, and Just Russia. Between 2003 and 2011, it competed in 136 elections and won seats 130 
of those. Its 269 seats over nine years were the third most. 
 Founded in 2006, Just Russia is the fourth largest party in Russia. It is politically center-
left, but maintains close ties to the Kremlin and supports the policies of Vladimir Putin. For 
example, its former leader and co-founder, during the 2004 presidential elections, in which he 
was also a candidate, declared his support for Vladimir Putin. Just Russia was formed with 
Kremlin support, qualifying it as a regime-project party from its conception. In a bid to 
seemingly weaken the strength of an increasingly dominant United Russia, the Kremlin directed 
the creation of Just Russia as a center-left alternative (March, 2009).  Sakwa (2008) writes that 
the creation of Just Russia has prevented United Russia from becoming a hegemonic party, an 
outcome that has split United Russia’s leadership. It is also considered a project party because it 
was created to take votes away from the KPRF and the LDPR.  
 Just Russia’s history is exemplary of the minor party merger trends that have occurred 
over the past five years. Just Russia is the result a merger of two minor parties, the Party of Life 
and the Party of Pensioners, and a project party, Rodina. The regional organizations of Rodina 
and the Party of Pensioners provided an immediate regional presence to the new party. Rodina 
competed in 48 regional elections, winning 51 seats in 16 different contests. The Party of 
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Pensioners competed in 28 elections, winning 64 seats. The Party of Life also competed in 28 
contests, winning 30 seats in nine regions. A fourth organization, the Ecological Party “the 
Greens” merged into Just Russia later. Its achievements were much more modest than any of the 
other parties in Just Russia. It won only one seat in the ten elections in which it partook.  
 From the amalgamation of a number of relatively small and relatively unsuccessful 
parties, Just Russia has far surpassed the achievements of its predecessors. Having only been in 
existence since 2006, Just Russia competed in the fourth most elections (75) of any party in this 
study; won seats in the fourth largest number of elections (62); and won the fourth most seats 
(206). The importance of its political closeness to the Kremlin should not be understated, though 
it, too, has faced pressure from the authorities, seeing its official support quietly drawn back after 
early electoral successes (March, 2009).  
A.b.: Russia’s Minor Parties and Former Parties: 
Most of the parties competing in the regions, though, fall into the minor party category. 
Three of the seven remaining parties in Russia today are minor parties. Yabloko and Right Cause 
are both small liberal parties, while Patriots of Russia is a nationalist-leftist party. While Yabloko 
has remained independent, Right Cause and Patriots of Russia have merged with other small 
parties since 2003. Despite having different economic platforms, their platforms are similar in a 
number of ways. Anti-corruption, protection of citizens’ rights, and reform of the political and 
economic system characterize each party. They also share a lack of electoral success and an 
inability to contest most regional elections. 
The Russian Democratic Party Yabloko has been in decline since 1993. In the context of 
systemic party weakness of the 1990s, Yabloko’s decline is consistent with larger anti-party 
trends in Russia. As the party system developed in the 2000s, Yabloko continued to be 
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increasingly marginalized. Parties of power, such as Unity, and its successor, United Russia, and 
A Just Russia have managed to consistently field and win candidates, as have leftist and 
nationalist parties like the KPRF and LDPR. Programmatic, liberal opposition parties, on the 
other hand, like Yabloko continue to lose ground. As Russia shifted into a power-opposition 
party system rather than a typical left-right continuum, LDPR, KPRF, and Just Russia, have 
coalesced around the state power structures, Yabloko has chosen to remain in opposition (White, 
2006).  
Noting Yabloko’s weakness at the federal level, White (2006) predicted that the party’s 
problems would similarly plague it and fellow opposition parties in the regions, as well. Indeed, 
regional political victories have proven as elusive for Yabloko as national victories. Although 
Yabloko competed in 29 regional elections, it won only seven seats (.2% of the total) in three 
elections, making it the smaller of the two major liberal parties in Russia.  
 Right Cause succeeded the liberal right minor party, Union of Right Forces. Union of 
Right Forces merged with two other minor parties, Democratic Party of Russia and Civil Force. 
The Union of Right Forces was the largest, most successful and had the largest political profile 
of its founding parties. It competed in 39 regional elections, winning 31 seats in 13 elections. 
The Democratic Party did not win any seats in the nine elections in which it competed. Since the 
party’s creation, Right Cause has competed in six elections, winning a total of 11 seats in two 
regions.  The party calls for a reform and restructuring of the bureaucracy and justice system, 
while improving and increasing the social welfare system.  
 Patriots of Russia is a nationalist-leftist party. Calling itself the “only genuine opposition 
and independent political force,” Patriots of Russia calls for a redistribution of wealth in order to 
restore Russia’s socio-political “destiny” of greatness. Its claim to independence is rather 
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dubious, it seems, given its leadership’s closeness to President Putin’s siloviki clique (Sakwa, 
2010). There appears to be a small degree of legitimacy to its claims of political independence, 
as evidenced by its denial of registration in a number of regional elections, a problem Yabloko 
and Right Cause have faced, as well. Similar to Yabloko and Right Cause, Patriots of Russia 
devotes a considerable portion of its party platform to corruption and “arbitrary justice”s in 
Russia. “Social protection for all” is the foundation of Russia’s economic and political future, 
according to its party program.  
B:  Regional Election Results: Party Lists 2003-2011 
One hundred and forty elections took place between 2003 and 2011. In these elections, 
3,447 seats were reserved for political parties. In all, 45 political parties or electoral blocs won 
seats. Average turnout was 50.22% over this time period. In the absence of a clear methodology 
for excluding elections with abnormally high turnout, the data include all elections.  
The spoils of reform have been decidedly in favor of national parties over regional 
parties, though there have been exceptions in a number of regional contests. Of the 3,447 seats 
reserved for parties, 3,348 went to national political organizations, the rest being won by local 
electoral blocs. For the most part, the gains have been lopsided in favor of the presidential party, 
United Russia. Of the 3447 seats apportioned by party list elections, United Russia won 2018 
seats. Its closest competitor, the KPRF, did not win even half the number seats that United 
Russia secured, winning only 563 seats. With 269 seats over the eight-year period, the LDPR 
was the third most successful party. Having only existed since 2006, Just Russia, closed the seat 















United Russia 140 140 2,018 58.54 
KPRF 135 130 563 16.33 
LDPR 136 100 269 7.8 
Just Russia 78 73 206 5.97 
Yabloko 29 3 7 0.2 
Union of Right 
Force/Just 
Cause 
45 15 44 1.2 
Agrarian Party 34 19 62 1.79 
Party of 
Pensioners 
28 23 64 1.85 
Patriots of 
Russia 
46 9 30 0.8 
2003-2011 Data Compiled from http://www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom 
As is suggested by the number of seats held by the large national parties, regional politics 
have achieved a degree of stability on the supply side of the electoral market. By 2009, seven 
parties met the requirements to be registered and compete in regional elections, down from 47 
that competed in elections in 2003, 35 registered in 2006, and well over 100 in the late 1990s. 
The absolute number of parties registered and participating in regional elections had been 
Peyton 28 
steadily trending downward with each electoral cycle. The total number of parties and parties 
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2003-2011 Data Compiled from http://www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom 
After 2006, the number of parties competing for PR seats begins to drop rather 
precipitously. As the system displayed a high degree of change, at least in absolute terms, the 
number of parties competing and winning seats per election on average reflects a lesser degree of 
change, though the downward trend in the total number of parties competing is still apparent. On 
average, 6.7 parties contested elections, with an average of 3.28 parties winning seats in 2003. In 
2004, forty-three parties and blocs contested elections, with an average of 7.58 competing in 
each regional election and 4.94 winning seats. During the elections in 2005 and 2006, the 
average number of parties competing in regional elections fell to 7.21, with the average number 
of parties winning seats also slipping to 4.36. These downward trends continued, excluding a 
slight uptick from an average of 4.83 competing parties in 2009 to 4.85 in 2010, until reaching an 
seven-year low of 4.58 parties competing and 4.08 parties winning seats in 2011. These trends 
are graphed below. 
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2003-2011 Data Compiled from http://www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom 
 
In seven regional elections in 2003, turnout was a respectable 55.9%. Twelve parties and 
three blocs fielded candidates. Eight parties and one electoral bloc won seats in at least one 
region. The organizational capabilities of the participating political parties are reflected by the 
ability of political parties to contest elections across multiple regions. Six parties were able to 
contest more than half of the regional contests, although only United Russia contested all seven 
elections. Although United Russia won by far the largest share of seats in the seven regional 
contests (110 seats out of a possible 165), a cross spectrum of political parties appeared on the 
ballot and won some share of seats. For example, in the Republic of Ingushetia, the presidential 
party, United Russia, a nationalist bloc, For Frolycha, and the liberal, reformer party, Yabloko, in 
addition to a number of smaller, nationalist-leftist parties won seats.  
The regional elections of 2004 saw greater participation by a large and relatively diverse 
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Surprisingly, for a presidential election year, turnout in 2004 (44%) was more than 10% lower 
than the previous year. Even more surprisingly, given that President Putin won a first round 
presidential victory, United Russia lost two regional contests and only received on avergae 34% 
of the vote in regional elections. That being said, United Russia proved to be organizationally 
superior to any other party. It managed to win 60 of the 195 PR list seats available. It was the 
only party to contest and win seats in every election, although the nationalist party LDPR also 
managed to field candidates in all 17 elections. The large number of elections seems to have 
stretched the resources of the nation-wide Russian parties, as only three parties managed to 
contest more than half of the seventeen contests. United Russia, the KPRF and the LDPR were 
the most capable organizationally, winning the most, second and third most seats of any parties. 
The 2004 elections marked a high point of electoral success for regional electoral blocs. 
Twenty-three blocs competed in one region alone. Of these 23 blocs, 15 won at least one 
legislative seat. A KPRF-Agrarian-Workers’ Movement electoral bloc in Altai managed to win 
more seats than United Russia. This victory was blunted by the fact that a pro-presidential bloc   
“ In Support of the Policies of the President” managed to win enough to seats to secure a 
majority for United Russia and its allies. A second, more lasting trend in regional politics is 
notable in the 2004 elections: the emergence of a Kremlin backed “project” party. Rodina 
managed in its second year to contest five elections and win the fifth largest number of seats.  
Only nine electoral blocs formed the following year for the 20 regional elections in 2005.  
Eight of these blocs won seats, though none won more than four seats and none competed in 
more than one region, suggesting that the political conditions conducive to forming blocs were 
not present outside of a few unique regions. For example, in Amur, the electoral bloc, For Our 
Amur, managed to defeat United Russia, the sole instance of electoral defeat for United Russia in 
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2005. United Russia won 47.8% of all seats, averaging 39% of the vote, earning 178 out of the 
possible 372 seats. Once again United Russia was the only party able to contest all 20 elections. 
Four other parties, the KPRF (18), the LDPR (19), Rodina (14), and the Union of Right Forces 
(11) contested more than half of the elections, although none of these parties managed to win 
even half the total number of seats that United Russia secured.  
The 2006 elections marked a sea change of sorts for regional politics in Russia. In the 18 
elections that year, no election bloc formed consisting of either regional or national parties. This 
development was a result of a change in the electoral laws, which previously permitted groups of 
two parties and public organizations to run together on a ticket. Partially as a result of this 
strategy no longer being a factor, United Russia managed to increase its share of the regional seat 
total (51% of all seats) compared to 2005 (48%), and win the most seats in all eighteen regions. 
In Altai, where a regional, leftist-nationalist electoral bloc defeated United Russia in 2004, the 
leftist-nationalist share of seats was instead split between four different national parties, giving 
United Russia an absolute majority of seats.  
In the absence of regional political parties forming election blocs, only large or 
moderately large national parties contested the 18 elections held in 2006. Of the twenty parties 
that competed, none were regional parties.  The remaining parties displayed their organizational 
capacities and national reach, or lack thereof, by their ability to contest multiple elections across 
twenty regions. With some level of national organization, seven parties managed to compete in 
more than half of the regions, though of these seven only four managed to win seats in at least 
half of the contests in which they fielded candidates. Twelve out of 20 competing parties 
managed to win seats, although only United Russia managed to win more than 20% of the 385 
seats available. Only five parties manage to win seats totaling in the double-digits. Of the 
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thirteen parties unable to field candidates in at least half the regional elections, four were 
deregistered by the end of the year for failing to meet the requirements of the second “Law of 
Parties” that increased membership requirements to 40,000 members.  
There were 24 regional elections in 2007. Although there were more contests than the 
previous year, sixteen was the fewest number of parties since fourteen parties and blocs 
competed in 2003. In 2007, Just Russia quickly became the fourth-largest party in regional 
politics. Just Russia competed in more contests (22) than the LDPR (16). and won a larger 
percentage of the vote, though it took fewer seats by a large margin (10 to the LDPR’s 49). Only 
the KPRF and United Russia fielded candidates in all 24 elections. In all, five parties fielded 
candidates in at least half of the contests, and the liberal party Union of Right Forces managed to 
get on the ballot in 11 contests and won seats in five regions.  On the surface, the results in 2007 
seem to reflect some positive trends. Nine parties won seats, including two liberal parties. The 
left, right, and center of the political spectrum won seats, although the results were typically 
lopsided for United Russia. 
Significant success for parties other than United Russia should not be exaggerated. 
United Russia won its largest share of the regional seats yet, winning 409 of the 687 PR seats 
available in 2007. Its next closest competitor, the KPRF, only managed to win 112 seats, good 
for 16% of the total, but dwarfed by United Russia’s 59.5%. If one adds the seats won by Just 
Russia, an ally of United Russia, UR and its political allies won 71.3% of the seats in 2007. The 
only liberal parties competing, the Union of Right Forces nine seats and the Green Party’s one 
seat combined accounted for only 1.4% of the total seats available. Yabloko did not win any 
seats, even in its traditional areas of support in Moscow and St. Petersburg.  
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 The electoral woes of Russia’s minor parties of any stripe continued in 2008.  Yabloko 
again failed to get on any PR list ballots in 2008. Three liberal parties (Union of Right Forces, 
Civilian Power, and the Green Party) were on the ballots in one, three and one regions 
respectively, but failed to win seats in any regions. 2008 was a presidential election year in 
Russia and United Russia’s candidate, Dmitry Medvedev, was popular. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
2008 marked the highpoint of United Russia’s political power in the regional legislatures. The 
party won 317 of the 445 seats available in the 16 regional elections in 2008. The field shrank 
even further, with only 11 parties competing. Of these, only six managed to win seats. With the 
exception of the four major parties (United Russia, KPRF, LDPR and Just Russia), two minor 
parties, Patriots of Russia and the Agrarian Party, won only 10 seats combined, or 2% of the 
total. The four major parties clearly separated themselves from the pack of smaller parties in 
terms of their organizational capacity. United Russia, the KPRF and LDPR fielded candidates in 
all 16 contests, and a Just Russia managed to compete in 15 regions. 
 The twelve elections in 2009, in many ways, looked very similar to the previous year’s 
elections and those that followed in 2010 and 2011. United Russia, against an even smaller field, 
managed to win 70.6% of the seats available (263 out a possible 372). Seven parties competed in 
at least one region. United Russia and the KPRF were the only parties to compete and win seats 
in every election. The LDPR and a Just Russia also fielded candidates in every regional election, 
managing to win seats in eight and seven regions, respectively. The liberal “left” Yabloko and 
liberal “right” Right Cause did not win any seats, not even in what one would expect to be more 
liberal Moscow city elections, and only appeared on the ballot in two regions apiece. The only 
other party to win seats, the socialist party, Patriots of Russia, won seven seats in two regions for 
1.8% of the total seat share. 
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 The final two election years in this study look remarkably similar. The four major 
political parties fielded and won more candidates than the three minor parties by a large margin. 
More than ever, the long, steady decline of the liberal parties in Russia appears to be terminal. 
Combined, the two remaining liberal parties combined to compete in only six elections out of a 
possible 26 and won only one seat out of a possible 607 seats (0.1% of the total). In 2010 and 
2011, the three minor parties competed, on average, in 3.6 elections and 2.3 elections per year, 
respectively.  The four major parties were on the ballot in 24 out of 26 contests and won 98% of 
the available seats.  
 In both years, all seven remaining legal parties in Russia competed in at least one region, 
although the three minor parties did not field candidates in even half of the regions in either year. 
The four major political parties managed to win every seat in 2010 (287 seats out of 287 seats) 
and the overwhelming majority in 2011 (309 out of 320).  Russia’s minor parties, on average, 
received less than 2% of the vote in 2010 and less than 5% in 2011 and only won seats (11) in 
2011. In only one region, Chelyabinsk, did all seven parties compete in the same election. In this 
election, as in almost every other election in 2010 and 2011, only the four largest parties won 
seats. 
 United Russia did match the level of near total dominance that it achieved in 2008 and 
2009. Its share of the seat total slipped from 70% to 58% in 2010 and 57% in 2011.  The KPRF 
surged to 20% of the total in 2010, though it slipped to 17% in 2011. The LDPR received 10% of 





B.a.: Electoral Trends in Regional Legislatures 
  In many respects, the political changes that occurred in regional politics after 2002 are a 
complete reversal of the period that preceded it. As intended when the new laws on political 
parties were passed, the regions have been integrated into the national political arena vis-à-vis 
the party system. Given the scope of the two laws on parties, this was, to a large degree, 
unavoidable. The question, then, became not whether a party system would gain a foothold in the 
regions, but rather what type of party system would develop in terms of which political parties 
would fill the institutional space provided for them, and to what degree. Recall that in 1998, no 
party could claim to hold a majority of seats in any regional legislature. In only five regions were 
the majority of seats held by deputies of any political party, and only the KPRF had the 
organization capacity to consistently contest elections across multiple regions.  
 By 2011, one party held a majority of PR seats in the great majority of Russia’s regions. 
The KPRF and LDPR have adapted and found more success in the regions because of it. The 
minor parties have found relatively little success, but can be said to have been no less successful 
than before the reforms went into effect. At the very least the minor parties have been more 
successful in the regions than at the federal level over the same period. From the near total 
absence of national parties in the early 2000s, four parties compete in nearly every regional 
election and a host of minor parties field candidates in multiple region. Over the whole period of 
this study, six parties (United Russia, KPRF, LDPR, Just Russia, Agrarian Party, and Party of 
Pensioners) managed to win more 1% of the total share of PR seats in years in which they 







KPRF LDPR Just 
Russia 







100 96.42 97.14 93.58 20.71 38.01 15.78 
2003-2012 
Won Seats (%) 
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2003-2011 Data Compiled from http://www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom. Third Election Cycle (Golosov, 2003). 
 
 Changes to the broader system are perhaps illustrated best when one divides the time 
period of interest into two distinct periods. The major shift is from regional parties and minor 
national parties competing regional contests and having some success to the total control by the 
major parties.  This former part consists of the 62 elections that took place from 2003 to 2006. 
During this first period, 63 major and minor parties and blocs competed across a large number of 
regions and a relatively large number of parties and blocs (42) managed to win a share of seats. 
Although the major parties won the most seats every year, the minor parties and electoral blocs 
managed to secure a respectable percentage of the available seats. In 2003, the percentage was 
low, only 12.7 %, compared with the 87% won by the major parties. In 2004, minor parties 
increased their share to a respectable 25.7% versus 74.2% by the major parties. The minor party 
share decreased to 15.8% in 2005, but increased in 2006 to 23.1%.  
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Beginning in 2007, however, after the pool of parties contracted significantly, the share 
of seats won by the major parties ballooned. The percentage of seats held by minor parts dipped 
to 5.2%, while the major parties secured 94.7% of all regional seats available that election year. 
Each of the three years that followed resulted in an increase in the percentage held by the major 
parties in regional elections. The 97.7% of all seats won by major parties in 2008 increased in 
2009 to 98.1% of all seats and climbed further still in 2010 to 100% of regional seats. Although 
the percentage of seats won by the major parties could only decline from there, in 2011 the four 
parties still managed to win 96.5% of the seats that year. These trends are graphed below.
 
Data compiled from http://www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom 
 
To group the four major parties together drastically understates how lopsided the share of 
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party of power has just as equally defeated the KPRF, LDPR and Just Russia.  In every year, 
United Russia’s share of the seats won by the major parties never constituted less than when it 
secured 56.5% of the major party seats in 2005. In 2003, 2008, and 2009, United Russia won 
more 70% of all the seats won by the major parties. In both 2010 and 2011 its share of the seats 
won by the major parties dipped below 60% for only the second and third time in the current 
study. This trend is graphed below. 
 
Data compiled from http://www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom 
 
 
B.b.: Single Member Districts 
 
 United Russia’s dominance in the regions extends into single member district elections, 
as well. In fact, for the seats that were once most securely held by independents, United Russia 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
United Russia 66.66 46.42 47.84 51.16 59.53 71.23 70.69 57.83 57.18
Major Parties 20.6 26.19 36.82 25.71 35.22 26.69 27.41 22.29 39.37
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has been more dominant in SMD contests than it has been in for PR seats. Complete SMD 
returns were not available on the Central Election Commission’s online database; therefore the 
data below is drawn from 31 elections between 2008 and 2010. Over the same period, 42 
elections were held in all.  
 Coupled with United Russia’s share of PR seats, the lopsided state of regional politics 
comes into fuller focus with the addition of their SMD seats. Independents as a group perform 
better than the remaining parties, but their status as the most notable feature of regional politics 
in Russia, if not also the most powerful group, is clearly at an end. It may be that many formerly 
independent politicians joined United Russia and there has been relatively little political turnover 
in the regions. This is not clear from the data, however. SMD totals are in the table below. 
 
 Elections Total 
SMD 
UR Independents LDPR KPRF Just Russia Yabloko 
2008 12 300 229 47 4 4 9 4 
2009 7 194 156 29 1 6 8 0 
2010 12 234 210 11 2 7 4 0 
         
Data compiled from http://www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom 
 Note that minor parties are conspicuously absent and unsuccessful competing for SMD 
seats. Patriots of Russia, Yabloko, Union of Right Forces, Right Cause, and a host of other small 
parties have had little to no success in SMD contests. In this regard, the percentage of seats that 
the minor and major parties, with the exception of United Russia, has markedly dropped 
compared to the third election cycle. These parties rarely compete in SMD contests, seemingly 
for good measure given assured victory of United Russia’s candidates. Another trend is clear, 
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though, from the Central Election Commission’s candidate lists. In the rare event that minor 
parties attempt to compete for SMD seats. Along with numerous independent candidates, minor 
party candidates are commonly struck from the ballot. Yabloko’s candidates were struck from 
the ballot in three contests; Patriots of Russia’s in five contests; and Union of Right Forces/Right 
Cause’s three times. Given that the minor parties combined won only four seats, all of those in 
one region for Yabloko, they are actually more likely to be disqualified than win even a single 
seat in SMD contests.  
 
Conclusions: 
The purpose of this paper is not to ascertain whether Russia is or is not a democracy. It is 
not, although it contains many formal elements of democracy. At best, the Russian system walks 
a fine line between democratic window dressing and electoral authoritarianism, and fully 
developed, closed authoritarianism. At worst, Russia is and has been an authoritarian state with 
some surface elements of democracy.  What I did not expect to be measure, more than very 
roughly, is voter behavior using vote returns as a measure of public opinion. The presence of 
voter fraud, sometimes blatant, but more often subtle, seems to severely limit any accurate 
connection between election returns, voter behavior, and public opinion. On the contrary, the 
most important data in this study are seat totals because, even though they do reflect perfectly 
reflect the will of electorate, they do reveal the structure of political power in Russia today.  
In the past, party substitutes took the place of parties. Now, it seems, that controlled 
parties are substitutes for meaningful democratic institutions.  If democratic window dressing is 
constant across the whole study, then its form, at the very least, seems to have changed in a 
number of ways since 2003. It is not immediately clear which feature of Russia’s regional party 
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development will have more detrimental effects in the long-run: floating parties or managed 
parties. In effect, the Russian party system has become top-heavy with a few parties with nothing 
to support them, whereas before it simply had very little in the way of parties left to lose. If 
United Russia ceases to be a viable vehicle to support the presidency, going the way of former 
parties of power, and loses financial and political support, a huge political space will be left in 
regional and political politics. Will the “left leg”, Just Russia, be able to fill that political space? 
It seems doubtful with its position already undermined by the federal authorities (March, 2009) 
An outline of the system’s imperfect elements can give us hints as to the range of future 
possibilities. Optimistically, Russia could go the way of a number of former electoral 
authoritarian systems like Mexico, Taiwan, and Senegal. What we see now may be a harbinger 
of potential future changes to Russia’s political system. Recall that two of the four major parties 
(the KPRF and the LDPR) existed prior to the creation of an independent Russian state. If Russia 
undergoes further transformation, it is not unreasonable to expect these and other parties in 
Russia today to play a role in any future system.  Moreover, just as the soviet political elites had 
an outsized influence on the construction of the current system up to the current era, so, too, the 
parties in power now might be in a position of power to shape any future changes. 
The very possibility of this occurring seems to suggest an underlying weakness in the 
managed system in Russia today. What is the cost to systemic credibility in exchange for short-
term systemic stability? Assuming the system is stable now, how long will this stability last? 
And if the system collapses, will it be from within, with factions of political elites vying for 
power, or will it be from without, from a public that tires of the “stable”, but inherently non-
democratic system in Russia today? Petrov, Lipman and Hale (2010) discussed this tension 
before the protests the following year. They noted that while the system in Russia today seems to 
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have “successfully” addressed the problems of the previous decade, the inflexibility of the 
system could lead to an inability to address changing societal interests in the future. Still, the 
authors concluded that change was unlikely in the short term because of, “energetic and highly 
skilled manual control of the system… and the absence of major to society or need to for major 
changes of policy course”, but only so long as Putin’s and Medvedev’s personal popularity 
stayed high. 
 It would seem that not only has their collective popularity slipped considerably, but so 
have their management skills. A sizable societal shock in the form of mass protests has occurred 
since 2010, as well. Distrust and dissatisfaction with the system was on the rise before electoral 
fraud resulted in massive protests across Russia in 2011 and 2012. One of their proposed 
responses, currently in the Duma, is to relax registration requirements for parties. Given the 
relatively large number of parties that were able to compete until the second law on parties came 
into effect, if the new reforms go through, the number of parties may very well balloon once 
again.  
 The effects of such a change would be numerous and mixed. The number of registered 
parties could approach numbers pre-2003. Politics at the regional level may turn move “outside 
the ring road” again. Parties may float once again and any popular support for the party system 
today may erode further. If direct elections of governors were reinstituted, this reform would 
likely have an equally sizeable and unpredictable influence on the future of the party system. 
Regional governors will likely retain the lion’s share of regional political authority and power. 
Co-opting local party branches of the national parties, the creation of their own local parties, or 
local elite competition resulting in the formation of competing political parties have previously 
occurred in the regions, and may well occur again (Golosov, 2003).  
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Whether there is a sea change ahead in the regions is unclear as of yet, although there is 
evidence that the parties most active today will be involved in any future system. If it is from 
within, it is probable that the principle actors could come from the seven parties remaining in 
Russia.  Following the protests in Russia in late 2011 and early 2012, members of Just Russia 
opposed United Russia members in local elections, some winning (for example, in Yaroslavl 
mayoral elections) and others have lost, sparking further accusations of fraud and protest (as in 
Astrakhan, in which Just Russia’s mayoral candidate protested the results by going on hunger 
strike against supposed election fraud).  Whether these are signs of legitimate inter-party 
competition developing and as serious harbingers of change remains unclear as of yet. Russia is 
in fact on the cusp of systemic change, the party system will play a crucial element, either 
because its level of development had the seeds of democratic change, or because it did not.   
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